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Preface 
I begin the essay by presenting Wittgenstein’s criticism of philosophical doubt, a 
line of thinking that begins with his distinction between empirical and grammatical 
statements, continues through his remarks on the ‘standard metre’ and his criticism of G. 
E. Moore’s attempt to defeat skepticism in his article “Proof of the External World,” and 
culminates in his insight into the error that can lead to the confusion of philosophical 
doubt: the treatment of grammatical statements as if they were empirical, which in 
general amounts to the error of overlooking the undoubted assumptions of philosophical 
doubt.1   
The second part of the essay consists of a presentation of Kierkegaard’s criticism 
of philosophical doubt in his book Johannes Climacus, a criticism that functions similarly 
to Wittgenstein’s criticism.  Like Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard exposes the contradictions 
inherent in the skeptical procedure, contradictions that result from the skeptic’s error of 
overlooking the undoubted assumptions of philosophical doubt, and like Wittgenstein, 
Kierkegaard achieves this through both a linguistic analysis and an analysis of the subject 
of language: the subject.  Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard show that undoubted 
assumptions provide the context for philosophical doubt and that philosophical doubt 
betrays these assumptions. 
In spite of the fact that the title character of Kierkegaard’s narrative provides a 
sound criticism of philosophical doubt, he loses his self.  Part II provides a bridge to the 
                                               
1 At some points in this essay the reader might determine that this or that unmentioned Wittgenstein 
passage would be of benefit if it were included.  The following might be the reason for the absence of some 
relevant Wittgenstein quotes: in this paper I attempt to balance a display of the development of 
Wittgenstein’s line of thought while pushing forward and constructing the line of thought of this essay.  I 
do not simply want to present his ideas; I want show how he moves from point to point.  I want to display 
the traction of his movements. 
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second half of this essay, Parts III and IV, for not only is it my intent to develop a sound 
criticism of philosophical doubt and show how Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard 
compliment each other superbly to this end, I intend to develop an analysis of the subject 
of language, which is also the subject of philosophical doubt.  To this end, I turn next to 
the last chapter of Johannes Climacus, in which Kierkegaard develops an analysis of the 
consciousness for which doubt is a possibility, a consciousness arises in the collision of 
language and reality. 
In Part III, I present and develop Kierkegaard’s description of the consciousness 
for which doubt is a possibility.  Kierkegaard’s analysis of this consciousness, a 
consciousness that is a contradiction, sheds light on the following: the individual of 
philosophical doubt, to whom I will refer as ‘the agent of philosophical doubt’; the error-
producing structure of philosophical doubt; the resistance of the agent of philosophical 
doubt to a disclosure of the presuppositions that make doubt possible; the difficulty in the 
task of proving to the agent of philosophical doubt that he is in error, and the significance 
of Wittgenstein’s many attempts to show the reader the errors of philosophical doubt; the 
significance of Johannes Climacus’ losing of his self. 
In Part IV, I direct my expansion of Kierkegaard’s analysis toward the subjective 
side of doubt to directly address the problem of communicating the contradiction of 
consciousness to the agent of philosophical doubt.  In this section I continue exploring 
the significance of Wittgenstein’s attempts to show the errors of philosophical doubt, for 
at times in his writing it appears that a direct disproving of philosophical doubt is nearly 
impossible.  This issue directly pertains to the question of whether philosophical doubt is 
an essential part of philosophy, which I also address.  In my effort to galvanize the 
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problem of communicating the contradiction of consciousness to the agent of 
philosophical doubt, I explore three types of relation that may exist between the 
individual and the contradiction of consciousness. 
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Part I 
Wittgenstein: Grammatical investigations 
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein often performs a grammatical 
investigation.  One of the primary tools of this method of analysis is to ask whether the 
opposite of a particular statement would make sense in the same context.  In 
Wittgenstein’s taxonomy, empirical statements describe the world, and the opposite of an 
empirical statement shares the ‘sense’ of the original, i.e., the opposite functions under 
the same linguistic conditions as the original, and does not challenge these conditions.  
“That rod is four feet long” is a fine example of an empirical statement.  It might be the 
case that the opposite of an empirical statement is false: a group of people could perform 
measurements that show that a particular rod is only three feet long.  However, if the 
opposite of a statement operates under the same linguistic conditions under which the 
initial statement operated without challenging or altering these conditions, it is an 
empirical statement.2   
  On the other hand, grammatical statements usually concern how one thinks about 
the world, and they constitute (at least in part) the context in which empirical statements 
operate.  Consider the following:  “Every rod has a length.”  I can imagine a teacher 
saying this to a person who does not use the world “rod” correctly in a particular context.  
In this context of teaching, what would it mean to say “Every rod does not have a length” 
or “Not every rod has a length”?  Though these statements might sound strange, I can 
                                               
2 Wittgenstein’s distinction between empirical and grammatical statements applies to sentences or parts of 
sentences in context.  His emphasis on use is important in this context.  In a particular context, a person 
might ask another the following: “Did you leave the cupboard open when you left the kitchen?”  If the 
person is actually asking a ‘normal’ question about ‘the cupboard’ and ‘the kitchen’ (i.e., if he is not 
speaking poetically, fantastically, etc.), then this is an empirical question.  At one level, the answers “yes, I 
left the cupboard open” and “no, I shut the cupboard” have the same use in this context.  Though opposites, 
each answers the empirical question, and each is an empirical statement.  
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imagine abnormal uses of the word “rod.”  If one uttered the statement “Not every rod 
has a length” in a context in which “Every rod has a length” is a condition of the context 
(e.g., measuring length), however, it would amount to a challenge to this condition, a 
challenge to the practice and context of measuring length with a rod.  If one assumes that 
“Every rod has a length” means among other things that “If a thing is a rod, it has 
length,” one might begin to see how the negative statements derived from the initial 
statement fail to share the same sense.   
Wittgenstein elaborates on the character of grammatical statements by providing 
the following example: 
There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is 
one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is 
the standard metre in Paris.—But this is, of course, not to 
ascribe any extraordinary property to it, but only to mark its 
peculiar role in the language-game of measuring with a 
metre-rule.3 
 
The “peculiar role” that the standard meter plays in the language-game of measuring is 
one of definition.  Though in some contexts it is appropriate to treat the standard meter as 
an object in the world like any other object, in most contexts the standard meter serves an 
additional function.  In some contexts it would make sense to say the empirical statement 
“The standard meter is in that drawer.”  When I conceive of the opposite of this 
statement, I realize that the location of the standard meter is at issue – it could be in this 
box, in this drawer, etc. – and this is an example of an empirical statement.  In most cases 
when one says “The standard meter is a meter long,” however, one is dealing with a 
grammatical statement.  On the surface, the statement appears to be a sensible and true 
statement about the meter as it is in the world, for one can measure the standard meter, an 
                                               
3 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations.  Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., 1998, p. 25 (#50). 
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act that takes place in time and space, and apparently check the validity of the claim.  If 
this task were performed, one would measure the standard meter by comparing it to 
another meter stick.  This other meter stick, however, acquires its significance as a 
measuring tool from the standard meter in Paris.  Therefore, this task amounts to one  
‘measuring’ the standard meter in Paris by itself.4  In a sense, the odd activity of 
measuring the standard meter by itself takes place when one utters “The standard meter is 
a meter long” (in most contexts), for this statement includes the definition (“standard 
meter”) and a reiteration of the definition (“is a meter long”).5  In most situations, the trap 
to avoid is the treatment of “The standard meter is a meter long” as if it were simply an 
empirical statement.  Though I can imagine situations in which the claim would be 
appropriate (e.g., a person tries to teach another how to use the words correctly, how to 
play this particular language-game of measurement), in most cases, the statement could 
easily lead to confusion if one treats in as an empirical claim.6 
                                               
4 It is possible for standards of measure to be changed and replaced.  For example, there are now methods 
of measuring a meter that utilize standards other than the ‘standard meter’.  The point holds true, however, 
for in the context of ‘measuring with the standard meter as the standard’, one misunderstands the role that 
the standard meter plays in measuring if one both considers it to be the standard and measures the length of 
the standard meter with another meter stick because he doubts that the standard meter is actually a meter 
long.  Over time grammatical statements can become empirical statements and vice versa in much the same 
way that standards of measure can be changed and replaced.  In the analysis of these types of statements, 
attention to the context and use of statements is important. 
5 This is especially the case if the statement is treated as empirical.  If the statement is understood in context 
(i.e., as a definition, if that is its use in the context), the peculiar character falls away. 
6 The mistake of treating a grammatical statement as if it were an empirical statement is similar to the 
following scenario:  a drill sergeant teaches a private, one of her underlings and her future replacement, the 
correct way to accomplish some marching steps.  To find out whether her pupil performs the steps 
correctly, the drill sergeant asks the private to judge her own marching technique.  Upon hearing from the 
private that she executed the steps perfectly, the drill sergeant is relieved.  (For a moment, the sergeant 
thought that her pupil did not know how to march well.)  The drill sergeant’s conclusion is mistaken, 
however, for all that is verified is that her subject marches in the way she thinks she has been taught, 
possibly in the way that she plans to teach others to march.  The question of whether she marches in the 
way that her teacher tried to teach her is unanswered.  Also, it is unclear whether she correctly understands 
her own movements as she teaches them to others.  In this case, there is an ambiguous connection between 
the grammatical (the definition of how to march) with the empirical (empirical statements made in the 
encounter with objects in the world, all within the context of grammatical statements).  The treatment of the 
statement “The standard meter is a meter long” in most contexts as if it were an empirical statement shares 
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   By asking whether a particular statement can have a meaningful opposite, 
Wittgenstein helps eliminate some of the confusion that can arise from a philosophical 
consideration of a particular statement that overlooks the statement’s context and use.  
This tool will prove indispensable in the investigation to follow, for the philosopher’s 
failure to distinguish between these two types of statements invites much of the 
conceptual confusion that Wittgenstein attempts to expose. 
   In On Certainty, Wittgenstein addresses G. E. Moore’s discussion of the 
statement “Here is one hand, and here is another,” a statement that Moore claimed to 
know for sure in his article “Proof of the External World.”  This statement is similar to “I 
know I’m in pain,” a statement that Wittgenstein address in Philosophical Investigations.  
First, I will consider the statement concerning pain.  Found in the early sections of the 
private language argument in Philosophical Investigations, the following is a response to 
both the idea that only the person who is in pain can know that she is in pain, and the 
statement “I know I’m in pain”: 
  Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only 
from my behaviour,-for I cannot be said to learn of them.  I 
have them. 
  The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that 
they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about 
myself.7 
 
Though the ideas expressed here concern sensation language, the role that certainty and 
doubt play in a discussion of sensation language and Wittgenstein’s private language 
argument pertains to the question of skepticism.  If one performs a grammatical 
investigation on the statement “I know I’m in pain” by analyzing its opposite in the initial 
                                                                                                                                            
the dynamic of this teaching scenario, and Wittgenstein’s distinction between grammatical and empirical 
statements pertains to learning, teaching, and knowledge acquisition in general. 
7 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 89 (#246). 
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context, one finds that it is similar to the statement “The standard meter is a meter long.”  
In both cases, if one treats the statement as a description of the empirical status of the 
object (either the standard meter or pain) that could be false (opposite), confusion begins 
to take hold.  In this context, one would be treating the object as if one has empirical 
knowledge about it that could be incorrect.  Though pain is an empirical phenomenon, 
Wittgenstein stresses that one does not acquire knowledge of one’s pains; a person has 
pain.  It is a mistake to think that one can have pain and only later acquire knowledge of 
it.  Though the statements “I know I’m in pain” and “The standard meter is a meter long” 
partially consist of ‘empirical-type’ language, the first is not an empirical claim about 
pain, and the second is not an empirical claim about the standard meter.  In most 
contexts, the statement “I know I’m in pain” is a misleading distortion of the claim “I am 
in pain.”  When one treats the statement empirically, one incorrectly suggests that one 
could have pain and not know it.  Likewise, if in most contexts of measuring one treats 
the statement “The standard meter is a meter long” as simply an empirical claim about 
the standard meter, which would amount to one treating it incorrectly, one conceals the 
important grammatical role that the standard meter plays in the contexts of measuring in 
which the standard meter plays a role. 
   The empirical-type language in these statements makes it easy for a person to slip 
into a mode in which he8 treats them as empirical statements, but it is this 
misunderstanding that leaves in its wake the philosopher stuck in his metaphysical 
                                               
8 I have chosen to use the male pronoun when referring to the agent of philosophical doubt.  This is partly 
due to the fact that I cannot recall observing a person I knew to be a woman performing the activity of 
philosophical doubt.  Though I have no reason to believe that women do not perform the activity of 
philosophical doubt, I think it would be unfair to use the female pronoun in light of my experience, 
however limited.  (In turn, I do not wish to imply that philosophical doubt is an especially male proclivity.)  
As one hopefully expects, the term “agent” relates to the issues of this footnote, and the issues of this 
footnote relate to the subject of philosophical doubt. 
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dalliances.  This confusion results from what Wittgenstein calls “a picture that holds us 
captive.”9  The problem arises when one fails to look past the deceptive form of a 
particular statement.  Though these statements that I have discussed are composed of 
empirical-type language, they actually function more like definitions (in the contexts I am 
considering).  This comes to light when one examines the contexts in which they are 
actually used.  By concentrating on the form of empirical-type words found in many 
grammatical statements, an individual creates a ‘picture’ that inhibits him from realizing 
the meaning that sits below the (apparent) surface, and Wittgenstein often works to 
remove this picture.  By examining the meaning of a statement (how a word is used), 
distinguishing between grammatical and empirical statements, and performing other tasks 
employed in a grammatical investigation, Wittgenstein tosses a handful of clarity into the 
cauldron of philosophical misconception.  His insights directly pertain to the subject of 
philosophical doubt, for its manifestation is enabled by a picture that holds us captive: 
the treatment of grammatical statements as if they were empirical.10 
   Philosophical doubt can ensue when one fails to pay close attention to the 
grammar and use of grammatical statements.  In the following statement from On 
Certainty, Wittgenstein comments on the propositions that “stand fast”: 
I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for 
me.  I can discover them subsequently like the axis around 
which a body rotates.  This axis is not fixed in the sense 
that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it 
determines its immobility.11 
  
                                               
9 Admittedly, some apply the significance of this expression to other concerns (e.g., Wittgenstein’s 
criticism of the picture theory of language). 
10 It is important to point out that the terms ‘grammatical’ and ‘empirical’ pertain to the use of particular 
statements in particular contexts.  The different terms are not ultimate determinations that apply to any use 
of a group of words arranged in a particular order. 
11 Wittgenstein, Ludwig.  On Certainty.  St. Louis: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1972, p.22 (#152). 
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Though empirical statements like “The tree is dying” are subject to practical doubt, it is 
grammatical statements – agreements, definitions, ways one sees the world – that provide 
a context in which one can talk about the world and doubt whether a tree recently lost one 
of its branches.  Wittgenstein says that the axis, those propositions that stand fast, is not 
“fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast.”  The relationship between grammatical 
statements and empirical statements is similar to that of the axis and “the movement 
around it” that “determines its immobility.” 
   The skeptic (it would seem) fails to realize that an empirical statement is tied 
together by agreements and definitions that cannot be tested in the same manner as the 
statement in question, whether it is empirical or grammatical.  Wittgenstein says that 
unfounded beliefs,12 “a nest of propositions,”13 and certainty14 all support the realm of 
empirical propositions in which practical doubt functions, as well as philosophical doubt.  
How could one doubt without being certain of something?  How could one use language 
(i.e., think, speak, etc.) to question everything without adhering to agreements and ways 
of seeing the world that are the conditions for the ways one thinks and speaks?  
Wittgenstein provides the following insight: 
That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts 
depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from 
doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.15 
 
Practical doubt functions in a context formed by propositions that are exempt from doubt.  
As a scientist tests a hypothesis, or as a person questions her friend’s honesty, practical 
                                               
12 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 33 (#253). 
13 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 30 (#225). 
14 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 18 (#115). 
15 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 44 (#341). 
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doubt functions amidst a slew of agreements and beliefs.  These agreements, however, 
are overlooked by the exercise of philosophical doubt. 
   Moore tried to challenge skepticism in his attempt to show the certainty of the 
statement “I know there is a hand there.”  His effort suffers from some confusion, 
however, and fails to undermine the skeptical enterprise (in the way he intended).  He 
attempted to protect empirical claims from practical doubt by appealing to his knowledge 
of the object of an empirical claim, which in turn was an attempt to give empirical claims 
a special non-empirical status – a status like that of grammatical statements – to shield 
the claims against practical doubt.  His energies were misdirected, however, for practical 
doubt about empirical claims was not his foe.  His true enemy was philosophical doubt.  
Whereas the treatment of grammatical statements as empirical statements can lead to 
confusion, Moore’s treatment of empirical statements as if they were not empirical 
misses the mark, and likely adds to the confusion.  By criticizing and working through 
Moore’s attempt to protect “I know there is a hand there” against doubt, Wittgenstein 
illuminates its shortcomings and pushes closer to the correct target: philosophical doubt. 
Throughout On Certainty, Wittgenstein illuminates ways in which Moore’s 
treatment of the statement “I know there is a hand over there” is wrongheaded.  In the 
following, Wittgenstein points out one of Moore’s errors: 
“But can’t I infer “It is so” from my own utterance “I know 
etc.”?  Yes; and also “there is a hand there” follows from 
the proposition “He knows that there’s a hand there.”  But 
from his utterance “I know…” it does not follow that he 
does know it.16 
 
In this stage of his criticism of Moore, Wittgenstein notes what one can infer from an “I 
know” statement.  For example, one can infer “The phone is ringing” from “I know the 
                                               
16 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, pp. 4-5 (#13). 
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phone is ringing.”  It does not follow from “The phone is ringing,” however, that it 
should not be doubted.  Insofar as Moore tries to squeeze empirical substance out of “I 
know…” statements, he commits an error similar to some of the errors I address earlier in 
this paper.  For example, the testing of the standard meter by empirical means does not 
show that the standard is a correct, ultimate standard outside the context in which the 
standard meter is used as the standard of measure.   
   In the following passage, Wittgenstein notes another error made by Moore: 
The wrong use made by Moore of the proposition “I 
know…” lies in his regarding it as an utterance as little 
subject to doubt as “I am in pain”.  And since from “I know 
it is so” there follows “It is so”, then the latter can’t be 
doubted either.17 
 
Moore makes a mistake when he assumes that “I know…” and “I am in pain” are equal in 
their resistance to doubt.  By equating the two statements, Moore attempts to give the 
statement “I know there is a chair over there” the same kind of certitude as “I am in 
pain,” yet there is a fundamental difference between the two types of statements that he 
overlooks.  Moore treats “I am in pain” as a statement of knowledge about an empirical 
phenomenon.  As Wittgenstein points out, however, a person does not learn of his pains, 
he has his pains.  I learn that there is a chair in the corner, whereas I have pain.  With this 
incorrect move, Moore invites his detractors to thrust all the practical doubt surrounding 
“There is a hand there” onto “I know there is a hand there.”  This makes the job much 
easier for those who would challenge Moore’s claim that he is certain that a statement is 
true.  The doubt that functions in this realm of confusion is a philosophical doubt that 
thrives when one overlooks the grammar of the propositions in question, and 
Wittgenstein further defines this doubt as he analyzes Moore’s failed criticism of it.  
                                               
17 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 35 (#178). 
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   Moore appears to invite the skeptic to adopt the following course of action: isolate 
the proposition that is considered certain, treat it as empirical (hence subject to doubt), 
and show how one fails to objectively prove the empirical proposition.  Though in many 
situations it is entirely appropriate to doubt empirical propositions, problems arise when 
one treats grammatical propositions as if they were empirical propositions, and doubts 
them as if one were doubting empirical propositions.  Due to the fact that agreements and 
definitions provide for the context in which empirical propositions function, grammatical 
propositions always form the backdrop of empirical propositions.  The treatment of 
grammatical propositions as if they were empirical and the subsequent doubting of these 
propositions is a hallmark of philosophical doubt.  In his attempt to combat skepticism, 
Moore commits the same error that is at the heart of philosophical doubt.  In his attempt 
to defeat skepticism he reflects the error of the skeptical procedure by treating “I 
know…” statements as if they are simply empirical claims about objects. 
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Part II 
Kierkegaard: Johannes Climacus 
   Johannes Climacus is a chronicle of Climacus’ grappling with the issue of 
philosophical doubt.  He labors to live the maxim De omnibus dubitandum est 
[everything must be doubted].  Much of this unfinished book concerns Climacus’ 
working through of the following three theses in his effort to begin philosophy: “1) 
philosophy begins with doubt; 2) in order to philosophize, one must have doubted; 3) 
modern philosophy begins with doubt.”18  His mission is to become a philosopher and 
discover what it means to doubt everything.19  As Climacus considers the three theses, he 
ascends the ladder of philosophical truth.  Along the way, his criticism of the three theses, 
especially theses one and three, exposes their contradictory nature.  Unfortunately for 
him, he forsakes the clarity and importance of his own critical insights and pushes on in 
his attempt to become a philosopher.  It is the Johannes Climacus that he himself left 
behind – his footprints of hesitation on every rung of the ladder – that bears arms with 
Wittgenstein.  In the next few paragraphs, I will try to trace these footprints.   
   In his consideration of the third thesis – modern philosophy begins with doubt – 
Climacus exposes some of the congenital contradictions of philosophical doubt.  At first 
sight, the third thesis appears to be historical in nature (“modern philosophy begins”), 
whereas the first and second appear to be eternal (timeless) or philosophical.  Upon 
further deliberation, however, Climacus finds that the third thesis (modern philosophy 
                                               
18 Kierkegaard, Søren.  Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus.  Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985, p. 132. 
19 He has been told that to become a philosopher one must doubt, though it is not clear that one must know 
what it means to doubt everything to be a philosopher.  Thus, the following is a logical possibility in this 
framework: one could doubt everything, be a philosopher, and not know what it means to doubt everything.  
In turn, it is unclear whether there is a difference between ‘one must doubt’ and ‘one must doubt 
everything’. 
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begins with doubt) must be eternal, interchangeable with the first thesis (philosophy 
begins with doubt).  If one endorses the third thesis, one must understand it to be 
compatible with the first thesis, for if the third thesis were simply historical, one would 
admit to something preceding the historical beginning of modern philosophy, i.e., one 
would begin modern philosophy with something other than doubt.  With this admission, 
how could one begin modern philosophy with doubt?  Climacus then asks whether it was 
accidental that modern philosophy began with doubt.  If it were the case that the 
beginning of modern philosophy (doubt) was accidental, this would contradict the first 
thesis (with which the third must align itself), for as Climacus says, “It would appear as if 
the essential happened by accident.”20  In other words, if the beginning of modern 
philosophy (doubt) were not essentially doubt, it would contradict the first thesis (unless 
the beginning of philosophy in time is a synthesis of the historical and the eternal).  
Climacus then asks whether modern philosophy is a necessity.  If modern philosophy is a 
necessity, it is a consequence of that which preceded it, which is philosophy.  The first 
thesis states that philosophy begins with doubt, and the third thesis states that modern 
philosophy begins with doubt.  If I try to say something historical about the beginning of 
philosophy, I get into trouble, for if it is a historical necessity as is modern philosophy, it 
will also be a consequence of something else.  This would require an undoubted 
precursor to philosophy, which would contradict the proposed starting point of doubt.  
This causes trouble for the first thesis, for which doubt is the beginning of philosophy.  In 
an attempt to justify the third thesis, it appears that one must claim that the third thesis is 
a synthesis of the eternal and the historical, and that the first thesis must simply be 
eternal. 
                                               
20 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 136. 
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   If modern philosophy is eternal and manifested in time, it is a synthesis of the 
historical and the eternal.  Climacus notes that this very notion, however, is strikingly 
similar to the Christian notion of Christ, who in time is the eternal truth.  It often goes 
without saying that philosophy has a problem with this conception, and it seems odd that 
it would understand itself to be the same as that which it criticizes, that philosophy would 
doubt this in another but not in itself.  Regardless of this point, Climacus shares another 
insight that challenges this posture of modern philosophy: if modern philosophy holds 
that it began with doubt, and that it is a synthesis of the historical and eternal, it follows 
that something preceded modern philosophy and the doubt that gave it life.  As far as I 
know, it is never assumed by Christianity that the world (i.e., the historical and empirical) 
failed to exist before Christ’s birth.  If one defends the third thesis by holding that it is a 
synthesis of the historical and the eternal, one must assume that something historical 
preceded modern philosophy’s historical beginning.21  Though this assumption is 
necessary for the justification of the third thesis, one cannot maintain it and also begin 
modern philosophy, something that begins with doubt.  In attempting to rescue the third 
thesis from contradiction, it appears that one commits successive contradictions. 
   Climacus then considers the first thesis: philosophy begins with doubt.  He 
surmises that either doubt is a part of philosophy, or doubt precedes philosophy.  If doubt 
                                               
21 The doubt-certainty dynamic that I outline is perfectly compatible with the theory of recollection, 
perfectly compatible with the seek knowledge / find knowledge dilemma, in response to which Socrates 
proposed the theory of recollection: do I have the truth or do I have the truth?  I have it, but am I sure that I 
have what I think I have?  There are two things that I have, which might be the same.  How do I determine 
whether they are the same?  I doubt.  Descartes’ clear and present ideas are the truth, and function in the 
same way as the assumption that there is truth and that each is of the truth (which is the same assumption), 
the assumption of the theory of recollection.  In other words, this could be the formulation for both: I have 
the truth, therefore I doubt.  What has happened?  I, get in the way of the truth.  If I were not, then the truth 
could be.  I might be the truth, but I am not sure [though the truth is within me (premise)].  “I am the truth, 
therefore I doubt.”  The only thing that gets in the way of the truth and me is me.  Therefore, doubt myself 
away: Johannes Climacus.  Johannes Climacus is the embodied logical consequence of philosophical doubt.  
Yet one might see the flaw. 
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is a part of philosophy, every one is excluded from philosophy except the philosopher 
himself, as far as he is concerned.22  Why is there only one, if that?  To become a 
philosopher, one must trust the philosopher’s remark that philosophy begins with doubt, 
but even if one does this, philosophy has not begun (as far as that individual is 
concerned).  A trust in the thesis philosophy begins with doubt does not begin philosophy, 
for philosophy begins with doubt, yet if doubt is a part of philosophy and not the whole 
of philosophy, there is something within philosophy that is not doubted.  This poses 
another problem.  To push through these contradictions, it appears that one must believe 
to get doubt and philosophy going, but this is a further contradiction.  Climacus remains 
confused, and the question of how to begin philosophy is still unanswered.  The entry 
into philosophy eludes him.   
   After finding fault in the first and third theses, Climacus turns to the second: in 
order to philosophize, one must have doubted.  Instead of criticizing this thesis as he 
criticized the others, Climacus rests with the realization that the maxim De omnibus 
dubitandum est is the required preparation for philosophy.23  Though he has not learned 
how one could doubt everything, at this point in the narrative he decides to push ahead 
regardless.  He says that he “cannot even know whether doubting is a preparation.”24  The 
thought of doubting everything defeated him, and he takes it up as his mission.  “Come 
what may, whether it leads to everything or to nothing, makes me wise or mad, I shall 
stake everything but shall not let go of the thought.”25  The thought has grabbed him.  In a 
                                               
22 In accordance with the theses and the claim that philosophical doubt is a part of philosophy, all 
interactions between philosophers should consist of each person doubting whether the other person is a 
philosopher, along with whether he is a person, has brown hair, etc. 
23 It appears that philosophy has given him nothing and taken his self. 
24 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 159. 
25 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 159. 
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sense, he has become the philosopher, the philosophical doubter: through finding 
inadequacies and contradictions in each thesis, he even doubts that the maxim De 
omnibus dubitandum est is a preparation for philosophy. 
   From one perspective, Johannes Climacus is the story of an individual who tried 
to become a philosopher by following one of the three theses.  In working through the 
three theses, however, he finds it difficult to begin philosophy from the standpoint of any 
of them.  In his analysis of the three theses, he realizes that none of them can be the 
starting point for philosophy, for one must trust either the thesis or something else for 
philosophy to begin, which would be contradictory for a philosophy that begins with 
doubt.  Though he noted the contractions of each thesis that prevent one from becoming a 
philosopher, he remained in awe of philosophy.  To become a philosopher remained his 
goal.  Though the theses seemed flawed, he grew to feel that it was an inadequacy on his 
part that prevented him from entering into philosophy.  He often heard people proclaim 
one of the theses, or the maxim “everything must be doubted,” and he assumed that if all 
these other people found no trouble in becoming philosophers, he was surely the 
problem.  The elusive character of the theses enticed him, and he assumed that the 
importance of the theses required one to suffer through cumbersome training before their 
truth would be exhibited.  After all, he felt that an easily acquired truth is a mediocre 
truth at best. 
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Wittgenstein and Climacus 
   Throughout his deliberations, Climacus remained in awe of philosophy, the idea 
that one could doubt everything, and the peculiar nature of philosophical propositions.  In 
the Investigations, Wittgenstein makes some remarks concerning the ways in which the 
nature of philosophical propositions tantalizes the philosopher, producing in him or her a 
demeanor and cloudiness that stimulates philosophical doubt : 
One person might say “A propositions is the most ordinary 
thing in the world” and another: “A proposition—that’s 
something very queer!”—and the latter is unable simply to 
look and see how propositions really work.  The forms we 
use in expressing ourselves about propositions and thought 
stand in his way.26 
 
Wittgenstein notes that whereas many people treat propositions as ordinary statements, 
some, like Climacus, understand them to be strange.  Wittgenstein says that this results 
from the importance we give to propositions and a misunderstanding of how language 
functions.  When talking about propositions incorrectly, these forms of expression 
bewitch us into thinking that the propositions are mysterious.  Though Climacus 
challenges philosophical propositions and finds fault with them, he still maintains a 
degree of reverence for them.  Like Wittgenstein, Climacus disassembles philosophical 
doubt.  On a personal level, however, Climacus is swept up in philosophy’s intrigue, and 
begins committing the contradictions on a personal level that he previously criticized and 
dismantled.  Climacus is an example of a person who, in spite of all his diligence and 
mental agility, ends up treating propositions as queer and elusive.  He becomes the 
anonymous philosopher in whom Wittgenstein sees a type of philosophical disease, one 
                                               
26 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 43 (#93). 
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that begets itself as it prevents the person from using propositions correctly.  This ill 
treatment of propositions breeds philosophical doubt. 
   Wittgenstein distinguishes between empirical and grammatical statements in his 
treatment of the disease that leads to philosophical doubt.  Climacus performs a similar 
task in his analysis of the aforementioned three theses.  After concluding in his analysis 
of the third thesis (modern philosophy begins with doubt) that a historical beginning for 
modern philosophy is problematic, Climacus decides to consult others about the status of 
the third thesis.  He was disappointed, though, for it seems that others often used the 
terms “historical” and “eternal” interchangeably or imprecisely.  Wittgenstein’s use of 
“empirical” is strikingly similar to Climacus’ use of “historical,” and the same goes for 
the terms “grammatical” and “eternal.”  Something that exists in the world or has a 
beginning in time is “empirical” or “historical.”  Statements that are (or are similar to) 
beliefs, definitions, and mathematical rules are “grammatical” or “eternal.”  In multiple 
instances, Climacus shows the inherent contradictions in a given thesis by exposing its 
unacknowledged dependence on historical and/or eternal notions, whatever the case may 
be.  Against the backdrop of Wittgenstein’s empirical-grammatical distinction and 
Climacus’ historical-eternal distinction, I will now contrast Climacus’ consideration of 
the third thesis with Wittgenstein’s analysis of doubt to highlight the similarities between 
the two writers’ processes of inquiry. 
   Wittgenstein notes that the opposite of an empirical statement operates in 
accordance with the same rules as its positive counterpart, whereas the opposite of a 
grammatical statement would challenge and/or alter the rules in a given context.  He 
often asks what the opposite of a particular statement could be.  Though Climacus does 
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not ask this same question in his consideration of the third thesis (modern philosophy 
begins with doubt), his inquiry is similar and produces similar results.  As Wittgenstein 
explores the empirical use of a statement like “The standard metre is a metre long,” 
Climacus questions whether the third thesis, which includes a ‘historical’ term ‘modern’, 
is in fact a historical thesis.  Climacus quickly reasons that the third thesis must be more 
than simply historical, for as an outsider he fails to see how one could believe the thesis 
and begin philosophy if one were to admit that something historically preceded modern 
philosophy.  Climacus then reasons that the third thesis must have an eternal (timeless) 
import, for without it the thesis would succumb to the contradictions that arise when one 
considers it to be simply historical.  Wittgenstein has a similar insight in his analysis of 
the proposition “He knows that there’s a hand there.”27  Though the phrase “There is a 
hand there” follows from the phrase “I know that there is a hand there,” it does not follow 
from “I know that there is a hand there” that I know that there is a hand there.28  In 
carving up a grammatical statement, Wittgenstein shows that the attempt to derive 
empirical certainty from grammatical statements ends in failure, a failure that keeps the 
skeptical game going.  Also, if one admitted that the elusive statement in question is 
grammatical, philosophical doubt could slip away.  Climacus performs a similar move, 
for he shows that an outsider must resist beginning the doubt-project of modern 
philosophy if she realizes (and fails to forget) that the apparently historical thesis modern 
philosophy begins with doubt actually has eternal sense, for it would then contain an 
element of belief or truth.  It is true that a person can hold that the thesis combines the 
historical and eternal, but this only leads to more problems.  For example, if modern 
                                               
27 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, pp. 4-5 (#13). 
28 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, pp. 4-5 (#13). 
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philosophy’s inception (doubt) is historical-eternal, something historically prior is still 
implied, hence the contradiction.  If one correctly admits to the grammatical character of 
a proposition that one mistakenly treats as empirical, the empirical doubt (practical 
doubt) that one thrusts into the grammatical arena of beliefs and definitions, hence the 
doubt that becomes philosophical doubt, can be avoided. 
   By exposing the contradictory elements in theses one and three, Climacus shows 
that belief must play a role in one’s acceptance of the theses.  This admission, however, 
presents a problem for the individual who would take them up.  Individuals have 
endorsed these theses, though, and both Wittgenstein and Climacus attempt to 
communicate to the reader the beliefs and agreements that, if acknowledged, would undo 
the bind of philosophical doubt.  Wittgenstein shows that the form of many grammatical 
statements traps people into thinking that they are empirical.  For example, the statement 
“The standard metre in Paris is a metre long” is composed of words that appear empirical 
(e.g., “in,” “metre,” “long”).  Wittgenstein points out that at times one must look past the 
mischievous nature of the form of words to understand how the statement is actually 
used.  If this were done correctly, a person would have a harder time falling into 
philosophical doubt.  Many fail to examine the use and context of statements, however, 
and this invites a mysterious veil of doubt to enshroud grammatical statements.  Climacus 
shows that belief (in historical happenings or eternal truths/definitions) undergirds theses 
one and three, something that must be overlooked for the doubt-project to begin.  In 
multiple ways, Wittgenstein shows the same thing concerning grammatical statements 
that are considered empirical, and he shows that some statements that many treat as 
empirical are actually grammatical.  In light of the fact that empirical statements are 
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rightly subject to practical doubt, the attempt to ground grammatical statements in 
certainty by appealing to empirical statements held certain always fails.29  For 
Wittgenstein, if one realizes that the statements upon which philosophical doubt preys are 
grammatical, one might subdue philosophical doubt.  For Climacus, if one realizes that 
the third thesis is eternal and not simply historical, one might gain the upper hand on 
philosophical doubt.  Also, Wittgenstein and Climacus state what they consider to be an 
obvious truth: that one must believe in something if one is to doubt.30  In his analysis of 
the first thesis, Climacus mentions that if doubt is only part of philosophy, certainty 
might be the other part.  Both consider the relationship between certainty and doubt, and 
both show that when philosophical doubt functions in language – the only context in 
which it can function – agreements and beliefs precede the doubt-project.  Though in the 
story Climacus eventually succumbs to philosophical doubt, Wittgenstein and Climacus 
show that if one acknowledges the agreements, beliefs, and certainty that provide for a 
practical type of doubt, one has the opportunity to prevent unruly philosophical doubt 
from taking hold. 
   As with many of the books that Kierkegaard wrote, in Johannes Climacus he 
places great emphasis on the significance of the individual, whether he is considering his 
own life, speculative thought, or something else.  With this approach the reader is not 
given a grand speculative discharge of a particular way of thinking, though Johannes 
                                               
29 One might claim that Johannes Climacus’ critique is tautological because he begins with something, an 
object.  Is this not the same as the doubt-philosophy – it begins with nothing?  “Climacus duplicates his 
starting point, the doubter duplicates his…”  That it is is the site of contestation.  This is why parody is an 
appropriate tool.  But what is different?  Climacus interrogates the person and implores him to doubt, 
shows that the person is doubt, that in beginning with nothing, the person is beginning with nothing.  The 
parodical narrative: Johannes begins, and Johannes loses himself.  In the tautology of ‘nothing-nothing’, the 
self is overlooked.  In Johannes Climacus, Johannes loses himself. 
30 For example, in On Certainty Wittgenstein writes the following: “If you tried to doubt everything you 
would not get as far as doubting anything.  The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.”  
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 18 (#115). 
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Climacus is one of the few that comes close.  What the reader is given, however, is the 
story of a person who grapples with the issue of philosophical doubt through an analysis 
of the three theses, and Climacus’ struggle displayed on page after page.  Though he 
challenges the theses and unravels their contradictions, in a way he succumbs to them, for 
in the end he replaces his challenging attitude with resignation.  Though he conquered the 
theses, he ends up doubting everything.  The narrative form of the book expresses this 
odd condition: that one can speculatively conquer doubt, and then fall prey to it in turn.  
Climacus shows how the doubt-project is endlessly flawed from the individual’s 
perspective, and also that it is possible for one to win a speculative battle against 
philosophical doubt and then fall into its grasp.  Though Wittgenstein and Climacus use 
slightly different language in their analyses of doubt, they both expose the contradictions 
of philosophical doubt and the ways in which one can become spellbound by its allure, an 
allure that stems from confusion. 
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Part III 
The contradiction of consciousness in Johannes Climacus 
I have shown that Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein maintain that doubt requires 
certainty.  Wittgenstein shows that certainty grounds the common philosophical doubts 
that he analyzes, and he shows that these philosophical doubts are self-contradictory due 
to the fact that they simultaneously rely on and neglect assumptions held to be certain.  
Wittgenstein develops his critique by analyzing propositions in context, and Kierkegaard 
performs his similar critique of the discourse of philosophical doubt in another register, 
the bold pronouncements of doubt-philosophy: “Everything must be doubted.”  Like 
Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard shows that the starting point of philosophical doubt always 
simultaneously relies on and neglects assumptions held to be certain, and that a pure 
beginning of doubt is impossible. 
How does one conquer the philosophical doubt?  How does one show another 
person that the philosophical doubt is misguided?  In On Certainty, Wittgenstein nips at 
the heels of philosophical doubt, over and over, by showing in different contexts how 
assumptions held to be certain are overlooked, yet the seasoned doubter, if agile, is 
always ready to point out the following: “Thank you for pointing out the fact that my 
previous doubt was indebted to a particular certainty.  How do I know that this certainty 
is justified?”   
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein writes that doubt functions in a system, yet the 
propositions that “stand fast” for him are not explicitly learned: 
  I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for 
me.  I can discover them subsequently like the axis around 
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which a body rotates.  This axis is not fixed in the sense 
that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it 
determines its immobility.31 
 
Part of Wittgenstein’s strategy is to direct the reader toward the propositions that stand 
fast, propositions that are discovered, not learned.  These are the propositions that make 
doubt possible.  It appears, however, that if one can discover propositions that stand fast, 
one has the opportunity to doubt these propositions or one’s discovery of them, regardless 
of whether this doubting is wrongheaded.  If it is possible for me to doubt these 
previously undoubted propositions that structure the discourse in which I function, this 
new movement will determine the immobility of the propositions that stand fast.   If 
doubt is a possibility, then the propositions that stand fast for me provide for the 
possibility of doubt.32  Every doubt of the truth of previously undoubted propositions 
necessary for doubt requires propositions, yet there are always more propositions to 
doubt, always more propositions to provide for doubt.  Wittgenstein exposes the internal 
consistencies of philosophical doubt and refutes many instances of it, but is a non-
philosophical gesture the only means by which one can sidestep the philosophical doubt?  
Wittgenstein speaks to the difficulty of stopping with the propositions that one discovers 
and finding rest therein: “It is so difficult to find the beginning.  Or, better: it is difficult 
to begin at the beginning.  And not try to go further back.”33 
                                               
31 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 22, #152. 
32 One might claim that in two moments – a non-doubt moment and then a doubt moment – there are two 
different arrangements of propositions that determine the immobility of the propositions that stand fast.  
Even if this were the case, it appears that if there is something like ‘a consistent self through time’ or ‘a 
person who maintains identity through time’, then the propositions that stand fast in the first instance would 
provide for the possibility of doubt, which in this case would include the possibility that the propositions 
that stand fast can change.  Even if this is not the case, however, it is the case that even in doubt there are 
propositions that provide for the possibility of doubt.  In other words, doubt is tied to propositions that 
stand fast, propositions that provide for the possibility of doubt. 
33 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 24, #166. 
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 The two questions at this point in this investigation are:  1) Why can Wittgenstein 
only attempt to show in different ways that philosophical doubt is misguided?  
Wittgenstein can prove that a particular instance of philosophical doubt is incorrect, but it 
appears that one cannot convince an agent of philosophical doubt (if he is to remain an 
agent) by logical argumentation alone that philosophical doubt itself is misguided, for 
among other things, the logical argumentation simply invites more doubt.34  Or, is there 
something about philosophy such that philosophical doubt cannot be removed?  Is it 
necessary to the structure that doubt persists, that certainty is impossible?  2) What is the 
nature of consciousness such that showing appears to be the only option (unless a person 
simply does it)?  Or, why does Johannes Climacus lose himself in the wake of his valid 
critique of philosophical doubt?  Kierkegaard’s chapter “What is It To Doubt?” pushes 
toward the answers to these questions. 
 
At this point of the paper it might be appropriate to give the reader advance notice 
of both Kierkegaard’s method of analysis and the meaning of some of his terms.  His 
method of analysis and the terms he uses are interconnected.  This is partly due to his 
attempt to show the reader, over and over, what one can overlook as one thinks through 
the development of the concepts he considers.  Also, this is partly due to his criticism of 
Hegel.  In my opinion, he often retreads Hegel’s development of concepts, attempting to 
show what Hegel overlooks or suppresses.  The reader might find that consciousness has 
                                               
34 Many would surely claim that I should maintain that Wittgenstein does prove that philosophical doubt 
itself is incorrect, yet if it is the case that philosophical doubt is an essential part of philosophy, it appears 
that philosophy, which takes itself to have the final say on matters of proof in this type of context, might 
not be equipped to determine whether either Kierkegaard or Wittgenstein proves that philosophical doubt is 
in error.  This claim must remain outstanding for now, and hopefully the latter parts of this paper will shed 
light on the dilemma posed by my choice of phrasing in the sentence to which I am referring. 
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a propensity for overlooking or suppressing things in the same fashion.  In light of what I 
take to be Kierkegaard’s method of analysis, the traction of his development of concepts 
is important, along with the pace of his analysis.  Also, it is my opinion that 
Kierkegaard’s development of concepts compliments Wittgenstein’s attempt to show the 
error of philosophical doubt.  Some of Kierkegaard’s key terms are the following: 1. 
‘Consciousness’ arises in a collision between reality and ideality, and is both a relation – 
a third term – between reality and ideality, and a contradiction.  2. ‘Consciousness’ is a 
‘contradiction’ because it is the relating – the attempted unification – of two qualitatively 
different components, reality and ideality.  3. ‘Reflection’ is a presumed relation between 
two (e.g., ‘the thinker and his object’, or ‘thought about an object’).  It also might be 
helpful to know that though at times it appears that Kierkegaard speaks from the 
perspective of one who is aware of the contradiction of consciousness, it also appears that 
at times he speaks from the perspective of one who is unaware of the contradiction of 
consciousness.  Some of his comments on ‘immediacy’, ‘reality in itself’, and ‘the 
possibility of consciousness’ are likely examples of him speaking from this latter 
perspective.  Among other things, this shift in perspective might highlight ways in which 
one attempts to overlook the contradiction of consciousness. 
 
The section “What Is It to Doubt?” is the last in Johannes Climacus, and it is a 
kind of postlude to the narrative about Johannes Climacus.  At the outset, the reader finds 
that Johannes began a deliberation on the following question: “What must the nature of 
existence be in order for doubt to be possible?”35  Johannes turns his eye toward 
consciousness, in part because an answer from the empirical realm seems impossible, 
                                               
35 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 166. 
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“for if someone were to discourse on doubt in order to arouse doubt in another, he could 
precisely thereby evoke faith, just as faith, conversely, could evoke doubt.”36  If a 
particular empirical phenomenon can inspire doubt in one person and faith in another, the 
possibility of doubt must lie in human consciousness, not in the object itself (assuming 
that there is a ‘human consciousness’).   
 Johannes then asks “what the nature of consciousness would be when it had doubt 
outside itself.”37  He proposes that this is the consciousness of a child, that the 
consciousness of a child is not qualified, and that it is immediate.  “In immediacy there is 
no relation, for as soon as there is a relation, immediacy is canceled.”38  The thought is 
that if for consciousness there is no difference between consciousness and an object, then 
consciousness is “immediate.”  Johannes finds that ‘true’ and ‘untrue’ function for this 
unqualified consciousness in the following way: “Immediately, therefore, everything is 
true, but this truth is untruth the very next moment, for in immediacy everything is 
untrue.”39  At this point in his analysis, Kierkegaard is both leaving open the possibility 
of doubt not being an issue for a person by using the simple example of the child, and 
maneuvering in the language of ‘immediacy and mediacy’ and its traditional dilemmas.  
He continues: if this unqualified consciousness could persist, the question of truth would 
not arise.  This thought, which reflects a dilemma that appears in the Theatetus and 
“everywhere else,” as one with humor or a distilled spirit might say, addresses the idea 
                                               
36 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 166. 
37 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 167. 
38 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 167. 
39 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 167. 
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that ‘in the very next moment, insofar as the very next moment is a moment of mediacy, 
immediacy, which is no longer, is false’.40 
“How does the question of truth arise?” and why does untruth arise with it, or in 
“the very next moment”?41  The question of truth arises simultaneously with an appeal to 
something else, something other than both the object of thought and consciousness.  If 
there is a relation, there is no immediacy.  Once consciousness is in relation to something, 
there is mediacy, yet consciousness is the relation.  Strictly speaking, in Kierkegaard’s 
analysis, consciousness is not in relation to something.  It is the relating, which is a 
contradiction.42  How does consciousness arise?  Consciousness, along with the question 
of truth and the possibility of doubt, arises in a collision.43 
 The perplexing questions “Which is first, immediacy or mediacy?”44 and ‘can 
consciousness remain in immediacy?’ function in the same structure, a relation, a 
contradiction: insofar as there is consciousness, it is mediated consciousness.  Johannes 
claims that mediacy cancels immediacy, and it does this by “pre-supposing it.”45  The 
essential thought is that the structure of mediation requires immediacy to be, yet this is 
not ‘known’ (i.e., ‘certain’, in the sense of ‘once doubted, now certain’).  Johannes finds 
this “pre-supposing” to be active in consciousness itself: insofar as mediacy is (insofar as 
consciousness is), immediacy is presupposed.  Said another way, the presumption of 
immediacy is essential to the structure of consciousness.  Here I can begin to put a twist 
                                               
40 In mediacy, immediacy is false because it is no longer the case.  In other words, immediacy is necessarily 
false due to the structure of mediacy.  Hegel exploits this dynamic, that the structure of mediacy obscures 
immediacy, for he treats the immediate as both false and not known.   
41 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 167. 
42 In mediacy, consciousness is not its object.  The question of truth – whether I know the object, whether 
my claims are correct – takes place in mediacy, and doubt can continue in this consciousness due to the fact 
that attempts to eliminate doubt are always mediated (thought/language). 
43 Consciousness is the relation, and is not in a position to know what preceded it. 
44 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 167. 
45 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 167. 
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on Descartes: consciousness presupposes that it is even when it is not thinking; or said 
another way, not only does consciousness think that it is when it is thinking, but when it 
is thinking it thinks that it is even when it is not thinking.46  Here one can see the impetus 
behind the transcendental I.  This is not the end of the twist, however, for Kierkegaard 
drifts toward the thought that there is a structural disjunct between consciousness and the 
‘I’.   
Johannes continues: immediacy is reality, mediacy is the word.  “How does the 
one cancel the other? By giving expression to it, for that which is given expression is 
always presupposed.”47  In other words, when one relates to an object by means of 
thought, one simultaneously generates something other than the thing that is thought as 
one presupposes the object.  Kierkegaard explains this in the following: 
Immediacy is reality; language is ideality; 
consciousness is contradiction [Modsigelse].  The 
moment I make a statement about reality, contradiction 
is present, for what I say is ideality.48 
 
The thought is: when one thinks about an object, one is cut off from it due to the fact that 
one presupposes it and that consciousness is the relation between the two (thought and 
object).  One important thing to mention at this juncture is that Kierkegaard is claiming 
that the word – language, thought – is constituted in part by a disconnect between the 
thinking consciousness and its object.  Insofar as consciousness emerges – and if it is, it is 
mediacy – it is cut off from something.  Its emergence cuts.  A contradiction is whenever 
                                               
46 And one can see the impetus behind the transcendental ‘I’. 
47 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 168. 
48 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 168.  The reader might enjoy knowing 
that the Danish word that Kierkegaard uses for ‘contradiction,’ ‘Modsigelse,’ literally means ‘a saying 
against’ (mod – against, sigelse – saying), which is essentially the case in English.  Also, “mod” as a 
preposition means “against,” and “mod” as a noun means “courage.” 
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I express reality, for this attempt is made in a domain other than reality.  Consciousness is 
the relation, yet it is always at odds, trying to be something other than the relation.   
Johannes finds that the nature of consciousness is a contradiction “that is 
produced by a duplexity and that itself produces a duplexity.”49  The possibility of doubt 
lies in the contradiction of consciousness.  The true and the untrue only emerge with 
consciousness, which is both a contradiction and a relation between ideality and reality.  
Doubt is neither a possibility in reality by itself, nor in ideality by itself.  The possibility 
of doubt emerges as the relation between the two emerges.  The idea that reality could be 
‘in itself’ reflects the contradictory nature of consciousness – that one presupposes reality 
in talking about it and cuts oneself off from it.50  In other words, it is essential to 
mediation (due to consciousness) that ‘there is’, but this is not necessarily known.  
Consciousness bears the mark of certainty, but it is pre-doubted certainty.  If the relation 
between reality and ideality does not emerge, “consciousness exists only according to its 
possibility.”51  In reality itself everything is true, and in ideality itself everything is true.52  
In immediacy, everything is true and everything is actual.53  Possibility only emerges in 
consciousness, the collision of reality and ideality, due to the fact that the possibility of 
reality being otherwise only emerges with the mediation of reality and ideality, which is 
                                               
49 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 168. 
50 This provides a bridge back to Wittgenstein, for Kierkegaard is claiming that presuppositions partially 
constitute one’s thought about reality.  In other words, whenever I think about reality, it is a presupposition 
of consciousness that reality exists (if doubt is a possibility for the individual).  To express it on another 
dialectical level: I presuppose reality when I talk about it, and I also presuppose that doubt is not a 
possibility for it: I do not doubt that doubt is not a part of reality.  There is an element in thought that is not 
doubted.  Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigations point this out as well.  
51 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 168. 
52 As with some of Kierkegaard’s claims about immediacy, this claim reflects both the presuppositions of 
consciousness and the perspective of consciousness for which the contradiction of consciousness is not 
apparent. 
53 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 168. 
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also the emergence of consciousness.  Johannes concludes these thoughts with the 
following: 
Reality is not consciousness, ideality no more so.  Yet 
consciousness does not exist without both, and this 
contradiction is the coming into existence of 
consciousness and its nature.54 
 
The possibility of doubt arises with consciousness, yet immediacy (on the ‘level’ of 
mediation) or reality and/or ideality (on the ‘level’ of consciousness) simultaneously 
arise as undoubted (presupposed in the sense of being essential to the structure).  Here is 
the radical thought: consciousness, a contradiction, is caught between reality and ideality, 
and cut off from each.   
In summary, Kierkegaard finds that mediacy cancels immediacy by presupposing 
it, and consciousness presupposes the structure of reflection, a relation between two.  For 
consciousness, the relation between two is a possibility, and consciousness is this relation 
(and a contradiction).  Consciousness, which is a contradiction and the relation between 
ideality and reality, presupposes immediacy and cuts itself from it, and presupposes the 
relation between two.  Doubt would not be possible if consciousness, which is the third 
(the relation between the two), did not presuppose the two and place “the two in relation 
to each other.”55  In other words, ‘that there can be two’ emerges with consciousness, as 
well as the possibility of doubt. 
Up to this point, Kierkegaard has identified two presuppositions that determine 
the structure of consciousness for which doubt is a possibility: immediacy, which is a 
presupposed oneness, and reflection, which is a presupposed relation between two (e.g., 
the thinker and his object), though the relating itself, which is the contradiction, is not 
                                               
54 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 168. 
55 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 169. 
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apparent for this consciousness.  Consciousness is the third.  Johannes expresses this 
thought in another register, showing that if thinking is understood simply to be a relation 
between two (i.e., reflection), doubt is not possible: “We could not therefore say that 
reflection produces doubt, unless we would express ourselves in reverse; we must say 
that doubt pre-supposes reflection…”56  Not only does Kierkegaard, like Wittgenstein, 
show that presuppositions are necessary for doubt to be; he shows that doubt cannot 
result from reflection.  There must be a third, which is consciousness, that is the relation 
between two, yet most ‘problems of doubt’ concern the relation between two – the 
thinker and its object.  Kierkegaard has shown that any act of doubt is based on the 
assumption of the two that are in doubt.  In other words, any act of doubt presumes that 
the two are the case, and the questions of doubt and truth arise in whatever manifestation 
from something other than the two of reflection.  For example, one assumes a) the thinker 
and its object and asks b) does the thinker know the object?  The point is that the question 
is about the relation between the two, which is consciousness, yet consciousness, as the 
relation, is a contradiction that cuts itself from the two as it presupposes them.  The 
following quote exhibits the logic of this dialectic of doubt: “Doubt arises by way of a 
relation between two, but for this to happen the two must be.  Yet doubt, which is a 
higher expression, precedes and does not come afterward.”57  Doubt precedes?  This 
means that consciousness – as the relation (the third) between two – is prior to reflection.  
Doubt as a possibility only emerges with consciousness.  The two must be for doubt to be 
(the presumption), yet the attempt by consciousness to bring the two together – bring 
                                               
56 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, pp. 169-170. 
57 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 170. 
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reality into ideality, or bring ideality into reality – fails due to the nature of 
consciousness, which is the collision of the two.58   
 
The skeptic, or the objective doubter 
Reflection is handicapped from the outset.  Consciousness is between – the relating of – 
thought and reality, and as such it is interested.  It goes without saying, as it were, that for 
Kierkegaard “doubt is based on interest.”59  In Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard contrasts 
two attempts to deal with doubt: the attempt to treat doubt objectively, and the attempt of 
the Greek skeptic.  Kierkegaard claims that “it would be a misunderstanding for someone 
to think that doubt can be overcome by so-called objective thinking.”6061  Kierkegaard 
finds that doubt can be neutralized in forms of disinterested thought.  For example, in 
mathematics, one agrees to a set of propositions and then functions accordingly.  If doubt 
is active in a domain of knowledge, consciousness is active and at issue.  Any attempt to 
overcome doubt objectively would amount to an attempt to take leave of consciousness, 
and this very attempt would be structured by the presuppositions of consciousness.  In 
other words, an objective avoidance of the subjective conditions of doubt fails to address 
the issue of doubt correctly.  Consciousness prevents both a lack of interest and the lack 
of the possibility of doubt.  Johannes found “the conduct of the Greek skeptics far more 
                                               
58 Among other things, Kierkegaard is trying to prompt the reader to realize that reflection cannot cure 
doubt, for as long as it remains simply a relation between two, unaware that the relation itself is an active 
third, it remains unaware of consciousness, out of which the possibility of doubt is generated.  Among other 
things, this realization could amount to a “discovery.” 
59 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 170. 
60 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 170. 
61 The goal of seeking objective truth consists of a constant drive away from the subjective, in which 
Kierkegaard locates some of the essential components of doubt.  It is “so-called” because Kierkegaard 
maintains that if doubt is at issue (i.e., if consciousness is), then objective truth, which neglects the 
subjective, is impossible. 
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consistent than the modern overcoming of doubt.”62  Kierkegaard understands the 
skeptic’s goal of apathy to be an attempt to neutralize interest, the at odds of 
consciousness, and it follows from this analysis of consciousness that the attempt to 
overcome and resolve doubt objectively maintains the ‘problem’ of consciousness, all the 
while attempting to overcome doubt in a direction away from consciousness toward 
disinterestedness.63  The attempt to overcome doubt objectively is an attempt to take leave 
of the contradiction of consciousness.  This attempt must constantly avoid the 
contradiction of consciousness as it pursues a lack of interest and the overcoming doubt.  
One might see how the attempt to achieve a lack of interest would engender the 
‘problem’ of consciousness over and over.   
 
Consciousness as the problem 
 The attempt to overcome doubt objectively is effectively the same activity as 
philosophical doubt.  Consciousness must be in order for reflection to be.  The act of 
reflection overlooks consciousness, that which prevents reflection from success, insofar 
as success is truth, and insofar as truth is harmony between thought and reality. 
Reflection is plagued by the conditions of consciousness, that the two of reflection (e.g., 
the thinker and his object) are presumed, yet there is the attempt to align them in truth.  
Kierkegaard says that thought and reality are aligned on the level of consciousness in that 
each is presumed to be the case, and that consciousness is cut off from them both, yet it is 
out of this very collision that the question of truth arises.  At the level of reflection, 
insofar as truth is the ideal, consciousness is the problem. 
                                               
62 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 170. 
63 It appears that this is the ‘death instinct’ in Freud, the death instinct expressed on the level of the idea. 
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Essential to the structure of consciousness is the presupposition that the two of 
reflection are.  If doubt hampers reflection, what is the problem?  Consciousness.  The 
two are presumed.  If the two are presumed, why are they not aligned in truth?  If the 
ideal of truth is that the two be known independent of the presuppositions that they are, 
the truth-endeavor will fail because of consciousness, for the presupposition that the two 
of reflection are is an essential component of consciousness.  The enterprise of thought 
for which presuppositionless knowledge is the goal is effectively the same activity as 
philosophical doubt.  In each case, the agent of philosophical doubt betrays the 
undoubted presuppositions that structure the discourse.  Both activities require the 
avoidance of consciousness. 
The drive toward presuppositionless knowledge and the phenomenon of 
philosophical doubt are mutually inclusive to the point of indistinguishability.  One can 
observe this in the actions of others: in a given context, two people agree to a set of 
presuppositions, and determine the truth of their inquiry.  But wait, were the 
presuppositions justified?  Though the ideal of presuppositionless knowledge might not 
be explicit in the activity of philosophical doubt, it is effectively the case in the instances 
of philosophical doubt that I have considered.  For example, someone says, “Wait, we 
have not doubted this.  Are we certain of this?”  And then there is a new set of 
presuppositions, familiar maneuvers are employed.  “But wait, we have not doubted this.”  
And so on.  How does one stop? 
If in the activity of thought for which presuppositionless truth is the goal, or in the 
activity of philosophical doubt, one demands that begging the question is a fallacy, the 
truth-endeavor will fail because the alignment of the two of reflection in truth will 
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generate the fallacy of begging the question: the alignment of the two of reflection in 
truth will be indistinguishable from the presupposition of the two in consciousness.  In 
these types of thinking, error actually serves the purpose of truth.  The search for truth 
(i.e., a presuppositionless starting point, etc.) would stop without error.  These types of 
thinking demand a product different from the presuppositions that determine the structure 
of the discourse: error.  For these types of thinking, error is conveniently produced by the 
suppression of the contradiction of consciousness. 
 Truth and falsity arise from a source other than the two of reflection in the 
following types of thinking: the thinking for which presuppositionless knowledge is the 
ideal, the thinking that demands that begging the question is a fallacy, and the activity of 
philosophical of doubt.  The question of truth can only arise with the collision of ideality 
and reality that is consciousness, which is a contradiction.  Doubt as a possibility of 
consciousness arises with this collision as well.  It is essential to the structure of 
consciousness that ideality and reality are, yet how can doubt be resolved?  
Consciousness as contradiction prevents a harmonious relation between the domain of 
thought and the domain of reality precisely because it is the collision of the two.  The two 
are fundamentally at odds with each other if consciousness is.  In Kierkegaard’s analysis 
of the consciousness for which doubt is a possibility, the act of philosophical doubt 
would include the imperative to resolve the disjunct between the domain of thought and 
the domain of reality – the imperative to unify qualitatively different components that are 
in relation to each other.  Consciousness, insofar as it is, prevents this.   
 In the practice of thought for which presuppositionless knowledge is the goal, the 
presuppositions that structure the practice are the problem, more and more.  The same is 
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the case in philosophical doubt, for there is always something more to doubt, more and 
more.  The error of doubting that which is essential to doubting – the presuppositions –  
begets philosophical doubt.  Concerning the existence of ‘X’, if it is the case that in 
reflection the two of reflection are presupposed, the alignment of the two in truth will 
reflect the presuppositions, which will be problematic if one maintains that begging the 
question is a fallacy.  If this compounded reflection between the two presuppositions of 
reflection and the two determined in truth is the case, there must be something else, 
something other than the two.  Consciousness is the third, and it is out of consciousness, 
not out of the two of reflection, that truth, falsity, and the possibility of doubt arise.  It 
follows from my expansion of Kierkegaard’s analysis that if doubt, plain and simple 
doubt or grand philosophical doubt, is part of a discourse – philosophy, for example – 
then a contradiction is an essential and foundational part of the structure of the discourse.  
The principle of non-contradiction functions in a space opened up by a contradiction.  
The a posteriori proof of this, as if this type of proof were allowed, approaches the height 
of the Comic: how often has it been said that ‘that’s the one thing you cannot doubt, the 
principle of non-contradiction’?64 
 Insofar as the principle of non-contradiction is operative in a discourse, the 
contradiction of consciousness must be avoided.  The same goes for the type of thinking 
that has presuppositionless knowledge as its goal, for an encounter with the contradiction 
of consciousness could amount to a “discovery” that Wittgenstein talks about in On 
                                               
64 In light of this claim, one might see how consciousness actually enables the act of philosophical doubt in 
multiple ways.  For example, as I have tried to show here, and as Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein maintain, 
undoubted propositions would need to be in place for one to make the following claim: ‘That’s the one 
thing you cannot doubt, the principle of non-contradiction’.  It covers over the contradiction of 
consciousness essential to the structure of the discourse, conceals the crack around which the discourse is 
structured, and results in a truth-foundation at home in the Comic: consciousness (contradiction) on the one 
hand, and the principle of non-contradiction on the other.  Who says your left hand cannot give something 
to your right hand?  (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #268.) 
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Certainty, a discovery of the propositions that “stand fast”65 (though it appears that many 
agents of philosophical doubt are not phased by an encounter with the propositions that 
stand fast.)  This is also the case with philosophical doubt, for the engagement with the 
presuppositions would either reveal the error of philosophical doubt, spur on the activity 
of philosophical doubt more and more, or both.  This is also the case in the domain of 
thought for which begging the question is a fallacy, for one would engage the 
presuppositions of reflection. 
 The principle of non-contradiction and its support system helps secure both the 
pursuit of presuppositionless knowledge and the activity of philosophical doubt against 
the threat that consciousness poses.  It is the blinders that keep the contradiction of 
consciousness from view, enabling the pursuit of presuppositionless knowledge and the 
activity of philosophical doubt to function regularly, as they were.  The discourses of 
presuppositionless knowledge and philosophical doubt, along with doubt in the pursuit of 
truth, in general and in particular, arise out of the contradiction of consciousness, and the 
principle of non-contradiction plugs up the crack of the discourses, the crack that opens 
up into the contradiction of consciousness, the crack that is essential to the structure of 
these discourses.  The integrity of these discourses relies on the generation of error and a 
concealing of the contradiction of consciousness. 
 The imperative of truth and the possibility of error arise out of consciousness.  
The previously mentioned discourses must avoid an encounter with contradiction of 
consciousness if they are to avoid the fallacy of begging the question, yet an encounter 
with the contradiction of consciousness in this context would amount to an ‘error’ 
defined from within the arbitrary limits of the discourse that neglect the contradiction of 
                                               
65 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 22, #152. 
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consciousness, limits drawn inside the presuppositions of consciousness.    From within 
these arbitrary limits, begging the question and the breach of the principle of non-
contradiction would ensue in an encounter with consciousness, with the presuppositions 
that provide for the possibility of doubt, truth, and falsity.  This betrayal of the 
presuppositions that determine the structure of the discourse is a further error, however.  
It is an error that stimulates the activity of philosophical doubt, the pursuit of 
presuppositionless knowledge, and the like, yet there is another type of error that can 
serve the interest of the agent of philosophical doubt, presuppositionless knowledge, and 
the like.  It is error, here or there, everywhere or anywhere.  In other words, the error of 
neglecting the contradiction of consciousness helps sustain the activity of philosophical 
doubt, and the judgment that an encounter with the presuppositions of consciousness is an 
‘error’ helps to sustain the activity of philosophical doubt.  If in the activity of 
philosophical doubt the agent did not encounter error, the practice would cease.  If the 
agent is correct in truth, why continue?  The activity of philosophical doubt produces 
error as it sustains itself.  Philosophical doubt generates error, and I have shown why this 
is sufficient to sustain the agent and his activity.  Insofar as this error allows the agent to 
avoid the contradiction of consciousness, the agent commits the error of neglecting 
consciousness, the presuppositions, etc.  Wittgenstein screams this over and over:  ‘Look 
at what you are doing!  You are contradicting your own presuppositions.’  Can the agent 
of philosophical doubt understand the communication of this ‘error’? 
 Why does it appear that Wittgenstein can only show that philosophical doubt is 
self-contradictory?  In other words, why does it appear that Wittgenstein cannot convince 
the agent of philosophical doubt by means of logical argumentation that philosophical 
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doubt is necessarily self-contradictory?  The structure of philosophical doubt is such that 
the disproving of it can actually stimulate it.  I have shown different ways that this can 
unfold.  For example, a person directs the agent of philosophical doubt to the 
presuppositions that he neglects, yet this provides the agent with more material to doubt.  
At a more complex level, the structure of consciousness is such that an engagement with 
the contradictory structure of consciousness can stimulate the error of philosophical 
doubt if the agent shelters himself from the contradictory structure.  For example, the 
ideal of a presuppositionless starting point for knowledge demands that the agent pushes 
past the presuppositions provided for by the contradiction of consciousness, or the 
principle of non-contradiction necessarily renders the contradiction of consciousness as 
error, or the fallacy of begging the question demands error if the findings of the search 
for truth are identical to the presuppositions of consciousness.  There are more examples. 
 Wittgenstein points out another hurdle for him who would direct the agent to his 
errors: 
But since a language-game is something that consists in 
the recurrent procedures of the game in time, it seems 
impossible to say in any individual case that such-and-
such must be beyond doubt if there is to be a language-
game—though it is right enough to say that as a rule 
some empirical judgment or other must be beyond 
doubt.66 
 
Time is the doubter’s mistress in waiting.  There are many fruitful ways to approach 
Wittgenstein’s quote.  If it is the case that “a language-game is something that consists in 
the recurrent procedures of the game in time,” and if it is the case that Wittgenstein’s 
attempt to show that philosophical doubt is wrongheaded is part of the language-game in 
question, at least two moments will be in play.  For simplicity I will call the instance of 
                                               
66 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 68, #519. 
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the doubter’s claim ‘moment 1’, and the instance of Wittgenstein’s correction ‘moment 
2’.  If the two moments are not part of the same language-game, it appears that 
Wittgenstein has no chance.  If they are, the agent of philosophical doubt can contest 
Wittgenstein in multiple ways.  The agent can doubt that there is a connection between 
moment 1 and moment 2 (i.e., he can doubt the consistency of the language-game), he 
can doubt moment 1 itself, he can doubt that he made the claim during moment 1, he can 
doubt the claim, etc.  The list can go on and on, and the agent of philosophical doubt can 
exploit this as well, though I imagine that some of these agents have died before their 
time was up.  Each doubt functions in time, and each doubt is something one can later 
doubt. 
 There is another line of defense for the agent of philosophical doubt, and it 
concerns the structure of consciousness for which doubt is a possibility.  If Wittgenstein’s 
criticism is part of the language-game in time, and if this consciousness continues as the 
language-game continues in time, the possibility of doubt remains for the individual, his 
line of resistance against Wittgenstein’s criticism.  This is one reason why it is impossible 
to know that “such-and-such must be beyond doubt” at any given time, for the 
knowing/doubting/discovering of presuppositions takes place in time as the possibility of 
doubt continues from moment to moment.  The ‘problem’ that time poses for the 
communication of the contradiction of consciousness is a significant hurdle for him who 
would communicate the contradiction of consciousness to the agent of philosophical 
doubt, yet the problem that time poses does not appear to be an insurmountable hurdle for 
Kierkegaard in his critique of philosophical doubt.  For Kierkegaard, the contradictory 
structure of consciousness remains, and the two of reflection simply transfer to the 
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categories of repetition and recollection, which Kierkegaard analyzes in Repetition, 
Philosophical Fragments, and other books.  This compliments Wittgenstein’s claim that 
“it is right enough to say that as a rule some empirical judgment or other must be beyond 
doubt,” yet the task of convincing the agent of this appears to be impossible at times. 
Reality is a presupposition of consciousness, yet it is not essential to the structure 
of consciousness that any object that one imagines necessarily exists.67  One commits the 
error of philosophical doubt when one, in doubting the existence of a particular thing, 
effectively doubts the existence of the external world (reality).  Logically speaking, 
insofar as consciousness is, doubting the existence of the ‘external’ world amounts to 
doubting the presuppositions essential to consciousness, that the ‘external’ world (reality) 
is.  Wittgenstein screams this over and over in many contexts: “Look, you are doubting 
the presuppositions that allow you to doubt.”  One could attempt to show the agent of 
philosophical doubt that his doubt is effectively doubt of the external world, and one 
could prove this to the agent, over and over, with each successive doubt, until the agent is 
actually blue in the face, yet this ‘blueness’ and this ‘face’ would surely fall into the 
imaginary hands of the deft agent. 
I do not claim that one cannot arrive at the truth.  I have no problem with inquiries 
in which one agrees on presuppositions and keeps those presuppositions in mind.  The 
problem begins when the ideal of truth shoots past the presuppositions, neglects them as 
it relies on them.  It follows from what Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein state, which I take 
to be correct and which I am trying to explain and defend here, that the attempt to peek 
back behind the veil of the presuppositions depends on presuppositions, and when the 
                                               
67 This sheds light on Wittgenstein’s claim that “it seems impossible to say in an individual case that such-
and-such must be beyond doubt if there is to be a language-game—though it is right enough to say that as a 
rule some empirical judgment or other must be beyond doubt.” 
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agent of philosophical doubt does this and neglects the presuppositions, he is misguided.  
The question is: how to stop? 
 Wittgenstein is aware of this urge to ‘peek back behind the veil’:  “It is difficult to 
find the beginning.  Or better, it is difficult to begin at the beginning.  And not try to go 
further back.”68  Philosophical doubt is a machine that pushers further back, more and 
more, and I have shown how a ‘further back’ is error.  Wittgenstein investigates this 
tendency throughout On Certainty, along with the difficulty it poses for him in his 
attempt to show that philosophical doubt is wrongheaded.  His mention of the idealist 
who claims that there is a “further doubt behind”69 the practical doubt, along with “this 
transcendent certainty, which is connected to your concept of spirit,”70 are prime 
examples of his sensitivity to the urge to continue, the urge to find something behind, 
more and more.  Kierkegaard also puts this impulse in play in his analysis of 
consciousness as he navigates the dilemmas of immediacy and mediacy.  Kierkegaard 
puts a stop to it, however: the presupposition of consciousness, a consciousness that is a 
contradiction that arises in a collision of thought and reality, and is cut off from them 
both. 
One might now see how consciousness is the problem, why a ‘pure language’ 
(ideality) is often pursued in philosophy,  and why consciousness cannot fit into any pure 
language, or any pure relation between language and reality.  Consciousness hampers 
thought in reflection on “X.”  One might now see the impetus behind the transcendental I, 
which can cause many of the problems I have considered: consciousness does not appear 
in reality, and it does not appear in ideality, yet ‘it must be, must be other than these,’ as 
                                               
68 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 62, #471. 
69 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 4, #19. 
70 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 8, #47. 
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the claim would go.  There must be something more.  If I is, and is not in reality or 
ideality, I must be.  I=I. 
Kierkegaard provides a critical perspective on Moore’s attempt to prove the 
existence of the external world, a perspective that compliments Wittgenstein’s criticism 
yet approaches it from another angle.  The issue is not simply the thinker and the object 
and their harmonious relation in truth; the issue is the harmonious alignment of thought 
and reality.  Kierkegaard develops this line of thinking further: not only is consciousness 
something other than thought, but the ‘I’ is something other than consciousness.  Moore’s 
“I know this” covers up the contradiction of consciousness and the discord between 
consciousness and the “I”. 
 Regarding Johannes’ loss:  Insofar as Kierkegaard’s claims pertaining to the 
structure of consciousness are correct, the following is the case: In this framework I 
locate two forms of profound doubt – the philosophical doubt, which labors over the 
certainty and doubt of reality and/or thought and all that the imagination might find 
fitting in these two realms; and a doubt that tenses on oneself, i.e., a subjective doubt that 
simultaneously engages the contradiction of consciousness and suffers in doubt.  In other 
words, the first doubting concerns the object of consciousness from which one is cut off, 
and the second tenses on the I, the self, that I am, etc., however one would care to put it.  
Now does it not also follow from Kierkegaard’s analysis of the consciousness for which 
doubt is a possibility that, insofar as consciousness is for an individual, the individual is 
cut off from his ‘self’ – the notion of ‘subject’, of ‘self’, of ‘person’, what have you?  
This is how Johannes could come to lose himself despite his sound criticism of 
philosophical doubt, which is doubt on the grand scale, presuppositionless doubt that 
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almost demands, in a hushed cry, the transcendental I.  This demand creates the goings 
on, on and on, of philosophical doubt, of the error upon error.  The poetic explanation of 
Johannes’ fall is that he doubted the doubters and became one of them, ‘possibly’ the 
only one, or that he pushed the envelope so far that there was no one to receive it.  
Another answer: he explained and exposed the thought-structure of philosophical doubt, 
and was left with the contradiction, consciousness.  He sinks.  The form of this dynamic 
appears in Kierkegaard’s book The Sickness unto Death – that one cannot evade not 
being a self. 
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Part IV 
The problem of communicating the contradiction 
 
Imagine a language-game “When I call you, come in through the door”.  In any ordinary 
case, a doubt whether there really is a door there will be impossible. 
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 50, #341 
 
 
 
I have distilled the problem of communicating the truth to the agent of 
philosophical doubt down to the problem of communicating the contradiction of 
consciousness to the agent of philosophical doubt.  The word ‘contradiction’ makes 
perfect sense to the agent of philosophical doubt, however, if only because he endorses at 
his convenience the principle of non-contradiction and its complimentary principles.  
Telling the agent of philosophical doubt that consciousness is a contradiction will most 
likely fall on deaf ears, for as I have shown, the discourse of philosophical doubt is built 
to absorb the contradiction of consciousness into its error-producing structure.  What 
must be communicated to and appropriated by the agent is a further expression of the 
contradiction, which is that consciousness is a contradiction that opens up the space for 
contradiction, which can also be expressed in the following formulation: a contradiction  
opens up the space for the principle of non-contradiction. 
 At times, Wittgenstein’s method of showing, which he employs and develops in 
many of his writings, is strikingly similar to Kierkegaard’s methods of indirect 
communication.  In his attempts to show the error of philosophical doubt, Wittgenstein 
approaches the problem of philosophical doubt from many angles.  He employs multiple 
strategies to expose the contradictions of philosophical doubt and he applies these 
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strategies in diverse contexts, yet it is often the case that he fails to attain the degree of 
clarity or the level of persuasive power for which he strives:  "Here I am inclined to fight 
windmills, because I cannot yet say the thing I really want to say."71  Kierkegaard's claim 
about the structure of consciousness – that consciousness is a contradiction, the relation 
of thought and reality – explains the difficulty that Wittgenstein encounters in his 
attempts to expose the error of philosophical doubt.  Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein face 
this difficulty of communicating the contradiction, and in this final section I will direct 
Kierkegaard's description of the structure of consciousness toward the subjective to 
further define the errors of objective doubt and to further explain the problem of 
communicating the contradiction. 
 Most of the errors committed by the agent of philosophical doubt that I have 
discussed in this paper are structural problems inherent to the attempt to treat doubt 
objectively.  In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard challenges the agents of philosophical 
doubt to doubt diligently.  The agent of philosophical doubt who rattles his own cage in 
the objective maintains a false limit to the structure of doubt.  He conveniently draws the 
limit inside the presuppositions that he contradicts.  It is as if Kierkegaard says: 'Go right 
ahead.  Doubt it all, truly doubt it all.  And if you do, I do not expect to see you anytime 
soon.'72  His point is that the person who truly doubts – the person who persistently 
engages the subjective corridors that make doubt possible – literally will not have time to 
fool around with abstract doubt.   
 Like Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein is sensitive to the objective/subjective distinction 
in his discussion of certainty and doubt: 
                                               
71 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 51, #400. 
72 This is a paraphrase of the sentiment found in Fear and Trembling, pp. 107-111. 
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling.  Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983. 
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  With the word “certain” we express complete conviction, 
the total absence of doubt, and thereby we seek to convince 
other people.  That is subjective certainty. 
  But when is something objectively certain?  When a 
mistake is not possible.  But what kind of possibility is 
that?  Mustn’t mistake be logically excluded?73  
 
This quote compliments Kierkegaard’s criticism of objective doubt in Johannes 
Climacus.  Kierkegaard writes that treating doubt objectively is a misguided venture, and 
he directs the reader toward the subjective side of doubt.  Kierkegaard notes that the 
Greek skeptics were more in tune with the dynamic of doubt than the objective doubters: 
“They were well aware that doubt is based on interest, and therefore with perfect 
consistency they thought they could cancel doubt by transforming interest into apathy.”74  
They attempted to neutralize the will, the subjective side in which Kierkegaard finds the 
condition for the possibility of doubt – consciousness.  Wittgenstein’s quote points out 
that if doubt is a possibility in philosophy and if mistakes are to be possible in 
philosophy, then objective certainty is not possible because this would require that one 
logically exclude the possibility of a mistake.75  The agent of philosophical doubt puts in 
place a goal, at his convenience, that is unattainable.  He manufactures error to enable 
philosophical doubt to continue, and he manufactures error both in particular episodes 
and structurally.  The structure of philosophical doubt is such that objective certainty is 
impossible – that a mistake is logically possible – yet in the activity of philosophical 
doubt the agent treats objective ‘certainty’ as possible.  The donkey produces its own 
carrot.   
                                               
73 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, p. 27, #194. 
74 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, p. 170. 
75 A weaker interpretation of the word ‘logically’ in Wittgenstein’s quote might be justified, but the point 
remains the same: the claim of objective certainty in a particular instance is a claim that a mistake is not 
possible in that particular instance. 
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This takes me back to Part I of this paper, Wittgenstein’s distinction between 
grammatical propositions and empirical propositions.  The agent of philosophical doubt 
sustains the practice of philosophical doubt by treating ‘doubt’ and ‘certainty’ as 
opposites, as empirical propositions (i.e., either I have doubt about “X” or I am certain 
about “X”), yet the structure of philosophical doubt relies on them not being opposites 
(i.e., objective doubt is possible but objective certainty is not possible).  If the agent were 
to treat certainty as a possibility, it would either be a fine time to stop doubting because 
one would be certain that certainty is possible, hence know that certainty is actual, or the 
agent would find himself in a nice little contradiction, and to continue the process of 
philosophical doubt he would then doubt whether certainty is possible in an effort to 
maintain the structure, and the error, of philosophical doubt.  In the activity of 
philosophical doubt, doubt actually performs a grammatical function.  In the activity of 
philosophical doubt, doubt is not the opposite of certainty, yet the agent of philosophical 
doubt treats doubt and certainty as equally attainable outcomes of the inquiry (e.g., either 
I have doubt about “X” or I am certain about “X”).  This is another instance of a picture 
that holds us captive: by continually maintaining an ideal of ‘certainty’ that is the 
opposite of ‘doubt’, the agent of philosophical doubt mistakenly sustains the activity of 
philosophical doubt, an activity for which certainty is impossible.  
How might an individual relate to the contradiction of consciousness?  I suggest 
that there are at least three types of relation between the individual and the contradiction, 
which I will analyze in my effort to further explain the difficulty of communicating the 
contradiction: 1) the individual for whom doubt is a possibility who subjectively engages 
the contradiction, 2) the individual who engages the contradiction of consciousness who 
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is subjectively certain of the contradiction of consciousness, and 3) the individual for 
whom doubt is a possibility who is an agent of philosophical doubt. 
Consider the individual for whom doubt is a possibility who subjectively engages 
the contradiction.  If doubt is a possibility for a person, how might he think about and/or 
express himself – ‘that he is an I’, ‘that he is a subject’?  In Kierkegaard’s model of 
consciousness for which doubt is a possibility, consciousness is a contradiction, the 
relation between ideality (thought/language) and reality.  Presuming that ‘I am’, 
whenever I think of my self I am cut off from my self due to consciousness.76  Assuming 
that ‘I am’, if I consider my self to be a purely thinking being – that is, I am thought and 
thought alone – consciousness impedes this understanding of self, for consciousness is a 
relation between ideality and reality, and reality, which in consciousness is 
contradictorily related to ideality and which is an essential component of consciousness, 
hampers the pure apprehension of this proposed self that is pure thought.  Assuming that 
‘I am’, if I consider myself to be a purely material being, consciousness impedes this 
understanding of self, for ideality is an essential part of the structure of consciousness 
that determines the endeavor.  If I consider my self to be something other than either 
thought or reality, the contradiction of consciousness prevents me from knowing this 
because it is the relation of ideality and reality.  If I consider myself to be a combination 
of ideality and reality, I will need something other than ideality or reality – a bit of 
otherness – to determine the difference between the ideality and reality of consciousness, 
from which consciousness is cut off, and the ideality and reality of my ‘self’.  The same 
applies if I consider myself to be the relating of ideality and reality that is consciousness, 
                                               
76 One might prefer the expression ‘consciousness cuts me from my self in my thinking of my self’, but the 
truth is that I do not know and cannot know which is the case, whether I am cut or I do the cutting.  To rest 
in this and not go further – this is a cure.   
  53 
for it is not clear what ‘I’ is in this case.  I would need an other, ‘I’ would need to be 
other.  Therefore, insofar as the possibility of doubt is real for a person, the individual’s 
attempt to understand himself as ‘I’ (self) is made problematic by the contradiction of 
consciousness.  It appears that Johannes Climacus followed this path downward, and 
became engulfed in its subjective turmoil. 
The person for whom doubt is a possibility is in a tough position if he has 
subjectively engaged the contradiction of consciousness and desires to communicate to 
another person the fractured ‘I’ apparently left in the wake of the contradiction of 
consciousness.  If another person were to ask him to communicate this ‘I’, this ‘fractured 
self’, how might he respond?  The imperative to speak might even stimulate the 
subjective turmoil that I explained in the preceding paragraph.  Insofar as doubt is a 
possibility for this individual, the admixture of reality constitutive of the contradiction of 
consciousness will impede the communication of the ‘I’, fractured or otherwise, in the 
ideal realm of language.  Regardless of whether this individual takes his self to be purely 
material (reality) or a combination of ideality and reality, communication of this self on 
the ideal level will fail.  In an attempt to sustain an apparent harmony between his self 
and the word (the unit of meaning in ideality), this individual might take his self to be 
purely ideal, not in conflict with communication that is purely ideal.  This attempt suits 
the idealist and the objective doubter perfectly, yet as it overlooks the contradiction of 
consciousness that is the relation of ideality and reality, it overlooks the material 
component of the contradiction and engenders the errors of philosophical doubt that I 
have discussed in this essay.  If the word lacks a material component – i.e., if the word is 
ideal and a self-same identity – it will fail to serve the purpose of communicating the 
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subjective fracture.  How might the individual adequately reflect the fundamental 
brokenness of the ‘I’ if this is the case?  For some people in some situations, the 
communication of subjective brokenness generates a loss more profound than the sense 
of loss or brokenness that precedes the failed attempt to unify the brokenness in language.  
For some people in some situations, the communication of subjective brokenness is 
undoubtedly unproblematic. 
Consider the individual who engages the contradiction of consciousness and is 
subjectively certain of the contradiction of consciousness.  How might this individual 
communicate the contradiction of consciousness to the agent of philosophical doubt, for 
is it not the case that as the contradiction of consciousness problematizes the ‘self-
understanding’ of the individual for whom doubt is a possibility, the contradiction of 
consciousness problematizes the communication of the contradiction of consciousness by 
the person who is subjectively certain to the agent of philosophical doubt, as well as the 
appropriation of the contradiction of consciousness by the agent of philosophical doubt?  
The individual who is subjectively certain of the contradiction might be aware of the 
following: a) that if doubt is a possibility for an individual, the imperative of unification 
at work in language will impede the direct communication of the brokenness of the self; 
b) that if doubt is a possibility for an individual, the imperative of  unification at work in 
language will impede the communication of the contradiction of consciousness to the 
agent, for the contradiction of consciousness, which opens up the space for doubt, 
includes an essential component (reality) that is both constitutive of the structure of the 
communication of doubt and excluded by this communication if one maintains an ideal of 
language that includes the imperative of self-same identity in meaning; c) that if doubt is 
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a possibility for an individual, the imperative of unification at work in language will suit 
the needs of the agent of philosophical doubt perfectly by glossing over the material 
component of the contradiction of consciousness.  In light of these strictures, how might 
one communicate the contradiction of consciousness to the agent of philosophical doubt? 
Consider the individual for whom doubt is a possibility who is an agent of 
philosophical doubt.  The agent of philosophical doubt, for whom doubt is a possibility, 
demands a particular identity of anything he encounters, an identity that corresponds to 
contradiction as its opposite, yet the contradiction of consciousness, which opens up the 
space for the relation between contradiction and non-contradiction, is prior to the 
contradiction that corresponds to identity as its opposite.  In its demand for the derivative 
identity, the agent of philosophical doubt renders the contradiction of consciousness, 
which opens up the space for the corresponding terms of ‘identity’ and ‘contradiction’, as 
a derivative contradiction.  This derivation is ultimately a derivation from the error-
producing structure of philosophical doubt that obscures the actual presuppositions of 
philosophical doubt.  The split that is essential to the structure that makes philosophical 
doubt possible is fundamentally at odds with the identity that philosophical doubt 
demands.  Whenever one tries to communicate the contradiction of consciousness to the 
agent of philosophical doubt, the agent prevents the schism essential to the structure of 
philosophical doubt from taking hold.  The agent of philosophical doubt prevents the 
presuppositions of philosophical doubt from appearing, which amounts to the agent of 
philosophical doubt once again betraying the presuppositions of philosophical doubt. 
In Wittgenstein’s terms, the agent of philosophical doubt commits the mistake of 
treating grammatical propositions as empirical propositions.  He treats the contradiction 
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of consciousness, which is a presupposition of philosophical doubt, as empirical, as a 
contradiction of the type that is opposite to a non-contradictory object, a self-same, 
identical object.  He treats the contradiction of consciousness as a contradiction that could 
be otherwise (empirical), one that the agent can investigate to determine whether it is 
truly a contradiction.  This prolongs the activity of philosophical doubt and sustains its 
error-producing structure.  The contradiction of consciousness, on the other hand, is 
essential to the structure of philosophical doubt, a contradiction that forms the structure 
of the discourse in which contradiction and non-contradiction function. 
The agent’s use of the term ‘certainty’ can follow the same false pattern.  He 
treats ‘certainty’ as the opposite of ‘doubt’, which at times is correct.  Yet when exposed 
to the certainties that make doubt possible, certainties that Wittgenstein exposes in 
numerous contexts, the agent treats these certainties as derivative certainties derived from 
his understanding of ‘doubt’, whereas these certainties ground the practice of doubt and 
are prior to the derived understanding of ‘certainty’.  In truth, there are at least two types 
of ‘certainty’ at work in the phenomenon of philosophical doubt, and the agent, at his 
convenience, overlooks the type of certainty that makes doubt possible. 
It might be helpful to consider what happens outside the false limit of 
philosophical doubt from the perspective of the agent of philosophical doubt, as if the 
agent could simultaneously sustain both perspectives.  On the one hand, the contradiction 
of consciousness – in particular, the material real that consciousness contradictorily 
relates to the ideal – ‘contaminates’ the linguistic communication of the contradiction of 
consciousness.  In other words, language is the medium through which one might attempt 
to communicate the contradiction, yet if doubt is a possibility for either person in the 
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chain of communication, the material component (reality) of the contradiction of 
consciousness obfuscates the seamless, one to one transmission of meaning, ‘meaning’ 
understood purely on the ideal level.  From this perspective, when the contradiction of 
consciousness enters language by means of the individual, it disrupts the seamless 
linguistic chain of self-same units of meaning.  The agent of philosophical doubt 
demands this ideal of meaning from him who would communicate the contradiction of 
consciousness.  The objective doubter, and the idealist in general, demands a pure 
transmission of thought, which includes a demand for a self-same identity of the word, 
the phrase, the units of meaning, etc.  With the ideal plane of language in sight, what 
should the agent of philosophical doubt do?  He is aware that he himself is the problem, 
that if he enters the ideal plane he will contaminate it.  Will he engage the subjective, or 
will he take leave of his self, his little problem, and merge with the ideal plane?  If he 
chooses the latter, in one moment he overlooks the contradiction of consciousness, 
himself, and the presuppositions of philosophical doubt.  It can be magical to observe this 
act, for he is able to make it appear that nothing happens.  He remains standing, or sitting.  
Sometimes he does not even say a word. 
The agent of philosophical doubt, if he sustains his identity, forecloses the 
appropriation of any transmission of his error, whether this transmission is through 
language that is purely ideal, through language that is a combination of ideality and 
reality, or through material disclosure, e.g., a rock falling on his head.  He renders all 
objects, thought-objects or material objects, as self-same objects in line with the ideal of 
self-same identity in language that I have discussed, and this act forecloses the 
appropriation of the presuppositions that structure the practice of philosophical doubt.  At 
  58 
the root of these presuppositions is the contradiction of consciousness.  How does one 
communicate the truth to the agent?  One of Wittgenstein’s primary tactics is to direct the 
agent toward the presuppositions, over and over, presuppositions that constitute a 
particular language-game.  Using other terminology, Kierkegaard employs this tactic as 
well.  The agent’s resistance to the truth of his error – his resistance to an encounter with 
the contradiction of consciousness – sustains the structure of philosophical doubt.  
Nowhere in this paper have I written that the truth of the error of philosophical doubt or 
the contradiction of consciousness cannot be communicated in language.  I claim, 
however, that if doubt is a possibility for an individual – if the individual is not 
subjectively certain – the ideal of unification in language, which suits the resistance and 
error-producing activity of the agent of philosophical doubt, will gloss over the material 
component that is contradictorily related to ideality in consciousness, and it is this 
contradictory consciousness that makes doubt possible.77 
 I can tell the truth to the agent.  He can understand it.  Yet if he then relates to it 
as the agent, as an objective doubter, he distances himself from it.  In his relation to it – 
by means of the contradiction of consciousness, though he is not aware of his means – he 
                                               
77 It is true that this analysis – at least the analysis in the second half of this paper – relies on Kierkegaard’s 
‘critical’ exercise that focuses on the conditions of consciousness for which doubt is a possibility.  The 
agent of philosophical doubt might mount a criticism based on this fact, and also point out that Kierkegaard 
used language to think and communicate this ‘contradiction of consciousness’.  If I were to respond by 
saying that Kierkegaard was subjectively certain of his critical determination of the conditions of 
consciousness for which doubt is a possibility, the agent might respond by saying that Kierkegaard’s 
investigation was not philosophical.  This might be the case, that it was not philosophical, yet I do not 
claim that Kierkegaard’s investigation cannot or should not be doubted.  Am I not saying that the agent 
distorts the truth?  If the agent claims that Kierkegaard could not have been both subjectively certain of his 
conclusions and doing philosophy, then it appears that philosophical doubt is a necessary part of 
philosophy for this agent.  Nevertheless, my task remains: how can one effectively communicate the truth 
to the agent of philosophical doubt?  If I were to respond to this agent by attempting to show that subjective 
certainty is not necessarily non-philosophical, I would recommence the journey I took in this paper, in the 
same dialectical fashion and in the same spirit, though with some modifications here and there in content 
and approach.   
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treats it as a thought-object that is unified, not in discord.78  By means of the 
contradiction of consciousness he renders the contradiction of consciousness as a 
derivative contradiction, which is unified. 
The agent can appropriate the contradiction of consciousness.  He can rest in it, or 
he can subjectively engage it with a furious passion.  Yet he can also distance himself 
from it by relating to it objectively, and continue the activity of philosophical doubt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
78 The resistance to and avoidance of the contradiction of consciousness is also a matter for psychology.  
Interestingly and poetically, this might be the only thing with which the doubter would agree.  I do not offer 
this up as an ad hominem, though many would likely take this essay to be a personal attack. 
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